/29 cont./

*795 using animal fertilizers. The very solidity of the Murid hierarchy would make instructions and directives in this direction very effective if the leaders and the great marabouts were willing to give them to their talibés.

But this evolution should not be limited solely to the economic sphere.

To meet the criticisms of the politicians and the more advanced people, it is to be hoped, in the interest of the brotherhood itself, that the Murid leaders will orient themselves toward a new conception of their moral and social doctrine.

Making men work for almost nothing, while in exchange being content to assure them of eternal life and happiness after their death, can look like a swindle to any advanced man. It would be very difficult to put in the wrong those who might violently attack the brotherhood by standing on this argument.

It does not seem that such attacks can be unleashed at present with effectiveness; the time has not yet come, it seems, when political leaders will thus stand up against the Murid leaders and Muridism. Not only are the brotherhood and its leaders still very powerful, but, above all, they represent, better, they are, Islam; now every Senegalese, whatever his political ideas may be, is first of all Moslem, and he clings to his marabouts. It would be difficult to make him accept seeing venerated religious leaders attacked in the public square.

But evolution goes quickly and a day will come when men brought up on the political, syndical, and social struggles of the mother country will not hesitate to batter down the abuses of Muridism before a population to whom the development of education will have given more critical sense and a greater desire for social justice. But it is not desirable that such a struggle be instituted in Senegal.

[934] Certainly the spell over the talibé by his marabout is criticizable. Nevertheless that must not make us forget that
[935] the Koran recommends charity and that the Murid marabouts are not wanting in respect for this precept; any sick person,

/29 cont./

*795 [734] [735] any poor person can go to them to ask for alms and hospitality; he will be taken care of for a long time, and for nothing, and thus part of the funds collected by the marabouts is redistributed to their faithful in misfortune.

One must especially not lose sight of the fact that Muridism is /30/ an integral part of Islam, even though it does not completely conform to orthodox Islam, even though it has abuses and faults. It is primarily a spiritual force, and it is necessary that political and social evolution, indispensable to the young country of Senegal, does not take place against Muridism, against Islam, against all spirituality.

*795 666 648 It is known that the Senegalese marabouts in general and the Murid leaders in particular, on the occasion of the Referendum of September 28, were definitely in favor of the Franco-African Community. This attitude can not be explained solely, as some might insinuate, by their desire to preserve certain relations with France, whose pro-Islamic policy has always been favorable and profitable for them. The true reason for this choice is that, on the one hand, the marabouts well know the present state of the intellectual and political development of their compatriots, and, on the other hand, they want to defend their religion and its spiritual values.

They know that at the present time the advanced wing of the political and syndicalist world groups together advanced young people who are quite far from any religious practice and thought and very violently pro-Marxist, if not pure Marxists.

They probably feared that, by means of an independence as premature as absolute, the present leaders, moderate on the whole, would be very quickly left behind by the extremists and that these would then institute in Senegal a materialistic and atheistic regime to which true and good Moslems would not be able to rally, and from which, probably, the whole of the population would rapidly suffer.

*795 But the development of this prospect would carry us too far. Let us content ourselves, in conclusion, to bring it up and to

/428 cont./

* 511 796 [262] [735] For Korité, although meals more copious than usual are often provided, nevertheless the essential thing is the alms in millet or money that one gives to the poor through the marabout.

For these two celebrations, the percentages stated are not noticeably higher at the top of the table than in the lower part. If, for the first incomes, the family heads are often obliged to do more than their means allow, each seems to adapt himself subsequently to his possibilities (1).

1. For No. 43, the information given concerns the celebrations for Christmas and the first of January.

* 511 794 The religious assessments are less numerous than the syndical assessments, but harder to bear. They exist in only three cases above No. 20, but represent 2% of the incomes, and 0.8%. They again noticeably increase in the lower part of the table. As for the gifts to the marabouts, they are perhaps more frequent than we have shown. Many families must have wanted to conceal them. Added to the payment for the [875] teacher at the Koranic school (10 francs per week), these religious obligations end up by noticeably increasing the deficits that already existed at the start.

* 511 871 Just as certain products are encountered in only a few families in the case of the routine expenses, we are also going to find here some of another order, but often more important.

There is first the cost of sending the children to school; 13 families send their children to school, public or private, and the outlays made for this can be evaluated as follows:

/429/ /Table XV appears here/ /430/

No. 8: 0.8%	No. 17: 1.8%
No. 10: 0.5%	No. 20: 0.5%
No. 16: 0.5%	No. 28: 0.4%

[Text continues on p. 72]

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
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large proportion of Christians in the National Assembly. 563
At the time of the break up of the Mali Federation there was some attempt to disparage Senghor because of his religion, but it never gained ground. And whilst there is still in certain quarters some criticism of the presence of a Catholic President, it is not widespread. The fact that neighbouring Gambia's Chief Minister Njie is also a Catholic in a predominantly Muslim country suggests that a tolerance that is so rare amongst Muslim communities may be local to this part of the coast rather than peculiar to Senegal. Senghor himself has been particularly assiduous in his courting of the great Muslim leaders of the country. However French assimilation policy was certainly a contributory factor. Long contact with France and particularly the large number of Senegalese who have studied in France have meant that the modern élite is accustomed to the idea of Catholicism and is able to co-exist with it.

So far the picture we have drawn of modern Senegal is rather an idealised one: a large European minority is tolerated by the African majority and there is remarkably little theoretical or actual animosity towards it; it has a particularly homogeneous population in which traditional ethnic barriers are breaking down, particularly in the major towns which have been most heavily assimilated by France; there is little political friction of ethnic origin and religion does not play an important role in the determination of the country's affairs. Indeed the planning of Senegal's economic development was confided to a Catholic priest not by Senghor, as one might have imagined, but by the Premier, Mamadou Dia, a particularly devout Muslim. In some ways Senegal from a racial and ethnic point of view represents the ideal West African state. But it has its minority problems.

In a sense the Vallée du Fleuve du Sénégal can be called a minority area, but in many ways it is an economic rather than racial problem. Though the Toucouleur tend to look down on, say, the Wolof, because they do not consider [433] [735]

5: Crowder J-5 (1955-1961) 1962
MS37 Senegal MS37

563 [433] [735] them strict enough Muslims, the main distinguishing feature of their homeland, the Vallée du Fleuve du Sénégal, is its poverty compared with that of other parts of Senegal. Diop Abdoulaye in his study of Toucouleur immigration into Dakar estimates that the average *per capita* income of a Toucouleur of that region is little more than 4,000 *C.F.A.* [434] per annum, i.e. about £6 a year. It is this rather than any real tribal differences that makes the Vallée a special problem, and this as much as any ethnic factor accounted [665] for the existence of the *Union Générale de la Vallée du Fleuve.*

563 619 The only real minority area in the Senegal is the Casamance, whose special position is further emphasised by its separation from the main block of Senegal by the Gambia. In the past it has been thought of as geographically, economically, socially and even religiously separate from the rest of Senegal. A forest zone closer to its neighbours Portuguese Guinea and the Republic of Guinea, it remained very underdeveloped by the French, though the present Government is taking this fact into account with a special development programme for the area. This separateness was emphasised by the very name Casamance. The people describe themselves to this day as *Casamançais* rather than Senegalese, though this could well be accepted on the same terms as a Briton describing himself as Scots or Welsh. It is fortunate that the tendency is to talk in terms of regional rather than tribal origin. However one of the important factors in the Casamance has been tribal. The Diolas were until very recently an animist people with an entirely different social organisation from that of the main groups of Senegal, though as we have already pointed out they had traditional ties with the Serer which went as far as the injunction that a Diola should never spill the blood of a Serer. But today the Diola are being drawn into the main socio-religious pattern of Senegal. In the most recent estimate of the religious [162] [771] adherence of the population of Casamance, estimated at 327,500, 284,000 were Muslims, only 28,000 Christians and